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In the 1970s and 1980s, narrow diagnostic criteria for disorders like schizophrenia were needed to improve the reliability of clinical diagnoses. Research has also benefited from the reliability of recent DSMs, in that clinical characteristics of samples are more standardized across studies and thus more easily replicated. Moreover, the use of stringent diagnostic criteria laid the groundwork for studies to assess and demonstrate the validity of schizophrenia. For example, schizophrenia can be delineated from other disorders, it shows familial loading, and it demonstrates predictable measures of outcome.
Yet, despite the many benefits of classification systems such as the DSM, could the classification of schizophrenia be improved by integrating current knowledge with existing conceptual and classificatory schemes? In other words, can the reliability of the DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia be retained while its validity is increased? In this context, at least 3 limitations of the current DSM diagnosis can be addressed: its view that schizophrenia is a discrete category, its use of descriptive criteria that ignore information about the etiology and pathophysiology of the disorder, and its emphasis on psychosis (1).
As it does with other disorders, the DSM-IV places schizophrenia in a discrete category, not in a quantitative dimension. This definition holds that schizophrenia begins with the onset of its symptoms as listed in the DSM-IV; before then, the disorder cannot be validly recognized. The failure to meet diagnostic criteria has potential consequences: it can influence what type of treatment or services patients receive, whether individuals are accepted into a research study of schizophrenia, and how they are classified in a genetic investigation. In addition, the use of discrete categories raises potential problems for patients with symptoms shared by multiple disorders, because these symptoms may result in artificial boundary categories and elevated rates of comorbidity (2) .
Several factors indicate the value of examining whether a dimensional model more accurately describes the biological nature of schizophrenia. One of the most compelling factors is that a dimensional view of schizophrenia is consistent with multigene models of inheritance, and these provide the best account of the familial transmission of schizophrenia (3, 4) . Multigene models assume that multiple genes combine with one another and with environmental factors to cause schizophrenia. Thus, it is possible for people to have low, moderate, or high levels of risk factors that predispose to schizophrenia. People with very high levels are at high risk for developing schizophrenia, while those with moderate levels may have related conditions, such as schizotypal personality disorder, negative symptoms, neuropsychological impairment, or other neurobiologic manifestations of the predisposition to schizophrenia (5).
A second feature of the DSM system is the explicit separation of diagnostic criteria from speculation about etiology. This was essential when the DSM-III was published, because theories of etiology had not yet been subjected to empirical tests. By holding fast to this approach, however, perhaps the DSM-IV limited its ability to create more valid diagnoses. The DSM rejection of theoretical speculation about etiology should not lead us to reject empirical facts as irrelevant to diagnosis. If empirically validated knowledge about schizophrenia is not incorporated into diagnostic criteria, there exists a significant risk of maintaining a stagnant nomenclature-one that will not provide a solid foundation for further research.
There is also a risk of continuing the disconnection of treatment and etiology. Since antipsychotic medications were introduced, pharmacologic treatments have focused on alleviating the most acute and florid symptoms of schizophrenia; that is, those related to psychosis. Current treatment is not aimed at correcting specific causes of the disorder, nor is it aimed at preventing onset. Presumably, knowledge of schizophrenia's etiology would facilitate the development of more targeted treatment strategies and, possibly, safer treatments.
In fact, in the parade of DSMs, psychosis has been the sine qua non for schizophrenia (psychotic symptoms include delusions, hallucinations, and gross disorganization of behaviour or thought). But is that appropriate for a symptom that research and clinical experience show to be a nonspecific indicator of severe mental illness? If, in fact, psychosis has an etiology apart from other core symptoms of schizophrenia, then the DSM diagnostic focus on psychosis in schizophrenia could be a mistake. In the hunt for the causes of schizophrenia, psychosis could be a red herring (1).
The evidence sustains this view. It is clear that psychosis is not specific to schizophrenia or even to psychiatric disorders. It occurs in neurological disease (for example, Alzheimer's disease, Huntington disease, schizophrenia-like psychosis of epilepsy, vascular dementia, and traumatic brain injury), and it can be caused by a range of toxic substances. Beyond the prima facie evidence that apparently similar psychoses occur in diverse conditions, Schneidarian first-rank symptoms appear commonly in psychotic conditions other than schizophrenia (6). Moreover, several recent factor-analytic studies showed that measures of psychosis in schizophrenia did not differentiate it from other forms of psychopathology (7-9).
However, similarities between psychotic states do not necessarily imply that the underlying disorders lie on the same continuum. An alternative formulation is that, since psychotic states may impair functioning in a relatively global manner, their net effect may be to emphasize superficial similarities between psychotic disorders while obscuring more subtle, but defining, differences between them. Moreover, psychosis is an end-state condition that, compared with other indicators, is more distal from schizophrenia's causes and pathophysiology. In fact, evidence suggests that schizophrenia's pathophysiology is put into place long before the first psychotic episode (4). For example, higher-than-expected frequencies of obstetrical complications and prenatal exposure to viruses have been reported in individuals who later develop schizophrenia (10) . Similarly, post mortem studies have found brain abnormalities indicative of developmental problems in the second or third trimester of pregnancy, such as altered cell migration in the hippocampus, cingulate gyrus, and prefrontal cortex (11) .
A partial foundation for conceptualizing the biological and clinical manifestations of vulnerability to schizophrenia already exists in the body of research about "schizotaxia." The notion of schizotaxia was originally introduced by Meehl to describe the unexpressed genetic predisposition to schizophrenia (12) . Given current data showing that genetic predisposition may also interact with environmental events (especially those occurring early in development) and augment susceptibility to schizophrenia, Faraone and others proposed using the term to indicate the premorbid, neurological substrate of schizophrenia (13) . Indeed, studies of the nonschizotypal and nonpsychotic relatives of schizophrenia patients show that schizotaxia is not merely a theoretical construct. It has distinctive psychiatric and neurobiological features, including negative symptoms, neuropsychological impairment, deviant eye tracking, and structural brain abnormalities (13) . For reasons that are still unknown, this syndrome sometimes expresses psychosis, and sometimes it does not. As these neurodevelopmental indicators of the syndrome are more proximal to schizophrenia's initial causes than is psychosis, they could be useful as diagnostic criteria. Schizotaxia thus represents both a clinically meaningful condition in its own right and a potential risk factor for subsequent psychosis.
As the prior discussion indicates, 2 aspects of diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia should perhaps be reconsidered: their emphasis on psychosis and their reliance on signs and symptoms that are distal to the disorder's etiology and pathophysiology. The concept of schizotaxia is especially useful for this purpose, as it may be a more specific expression of the predisposition to schizophrenia than is the DSM-IV diagnosis. Unlike schizophrenia, schizotaxia is not masked by the florid clinical symptoms and neurotoxic consequences of psychosis that are seen in so many other conditions. Incorporating schizotaxia into the diagnosis of schizophrenia would be a radical departure from tradition, and such changes will require a strong empirical foundation. It has, in fact, been the lack of such a foundation that has heretofore prevented the inclusion of such measures (for example, biological or neuropsychological abnormalities) in previous versions of the DSM. Foremost, criteria for schizotaxia must be developed and validated by demonstrating predictive and concurrent validity through field trials. The criteria would presumably reflect the biological and clinical alterations that occur before the advent of psychosis. This would broaden the diagnosis of schizophrenia into 2 categories: schizotaxia and schizotaxia with psychosis (schizophrenia).
Whether the term schizotaxia or some other expression is used, nosologists will need to address both the nonspecificity of psychosis and the existence of a syndrome that has a biological connection with schizophrenia. The success of efforts to treat and prevent schizophrenia will depend to an important extent on accurate understanding of its causes. It may be time to consider research stratagies to assess the value of a developmentally sensitive, biologically informed approach to classification-one that would consider schizotaxia and schizotaxia with psychosis (schizophrenia) as distinct diagnostic conditions.
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